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Symbolic Exchange and the Gift:
Louis-Marie Chauvet and
Jacques Derrida in Dialogue

Benjamin Durheim

Benjamin is currently a doctoral student of systematic theology at Boston College. Previous to
his work at Boston College, he received a Master of Arts in Theology at Saint John’s School of
Theology•Seminary with a concentration in systematic theology. Benjamin’s main theological interests
include the way sacramental and liturgical theology intersects with ecclesiology. As part of his doctoral
work, he is especially interested in the Chauvet’s concept of symbolic exchange which he addresses in
his paper.
Introduction
The concept of the gift fascinates many
authors from a variety of traditions, and not always
for similar reasons. Differing hermeneutics give
rise to different visions of this basic experience of
humanity—the concept of the gift—and allow for
differing articulations both of its essential form,
and its very possibility or impossibility. This project
sets in dialogue two authors whose work touches
significantly on formulations of the gift: LouisMarie Chauvet and Jacques Derrida. After briefly
outlining each author’s approach to the gift (specifically its form and possibility, or lack thereof), the
discussion moves to comparing and contrasting
their approaches. The project finishes by arguing
that Chauvet constructs a specific nuance in his
concept of the gift/symbol that is absent in Derrida—and that Derrida would not agree with—and
suggests that at least one reason for this difference
is the differing hermeneutics with which each author approaches the subject matter.
Louis-Marie Chauvet
For Chauvet, the importance of the
concept of the gift derives from the place it holds
in the divine-human relationship. This is not to
say that Chauvet lacks a conception of humanto-human giving, but rather to say that his work
is concentrated primarily in the area of Christian
sacraments and liturgy, which means for him that
the origins of the gift are in God. In order to
understand Chauvet’s trajectory, this section of the
discussion briefly explores one main avenue in his
thought, that of “symbolic exchange,” as well as the
concepts that undergird it and spring from it.
In order to approach Chauvet’s concept of
symbolic exchange, it is important to take a cursory glance at what Chauvet means by “symbolic,”

or how he conceives of “symbol.”1 For Chauvet,
symbol is one of two methods of human communication, the other being “sign.”2 These two
levels of communication, while ultimately inseparable from one another, comprise quite different
ways of speaking about reality. Chauvet is careful
never to absolutely separate the levels of sign and
symbol from one another (for him they are always
intertwined),3 but in the interest of conciseness this
discussion intentionally leaves that nuance largely
by the wayside. When Chauvet speaks of signs, he
means the use of things in order to allow language
to convey ideas at something approaching face
value. A sign represents something—an idea, an
object, an entity—in a way that keeps that something at arm’s length; the sign is a method of simple
discourse.
The symbol on the other hand, is for
Chauvet the locus of a mediation of reality, rather
than a signification of it. While a sign points its
recipient to the thing signified, the symbol bears
the reality of the thing symbolized to the recipient.
In an example Chauvet uses to tease this difference
out, he speaks of two uses of the word “flower,”
one as a sign and one as a symbol.4 If the word
flower is used in a conversation between people discussing horticulture, it simply signifies the concept
of flowers in order to exchange information between the two participants. It signifies what the two
are speaking of. On the other hand, if a person is
lost and alone in a strange place and hears someone
A full explanation of Chauvet’s theology of symbol runs far
beyond the scope of the current discussion. As this is the case,
the discussion limits itself to only those aspects of Chauvet’s
theology of symbol that directly bear on the gift.
2
Louis-Marie Chauvet, The Sacraments: The Word of God at the
Mercy of the Body, trans. Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, MN:
The Liturgical Press, 2001), 74-75.
3
Ibid., 79.
4
Ibid., 75.
1
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say, “flower,” the person is not immediately drawn
into a conversation of horticulture, but rather
into the realization that he or she is not alone, and
that there is someone near who speaks a common
language. The word flower has symbolized the nearness of a person who may help, or at least someone
with whom the lost person can speak. Flower, in
this case, has symbolized the reality of the situation
and the other person—it has become a mediation.
The importance of the distinction between
symbol and sign in Chauvet’s thought (at least as
it relates to the gift) is that the sign belongs to the
world and logic of value/business exchange, while
the symbol belongs to the world and logic of gift
exchange.5 That there is indeed some kind of
difference between these two logics is something
Chauvet seems to take for granted (he cites Marcel
Mauss’s seminal work The Gift and assumes Mauss
makes a good case therein),6 but before exploring
the validity of this assumption, it would be prudent
to point out the implications Chauvet draws from
this distinction.
First, Chauvet argues, since the symbol
is within the logic of gift-exchange, and since it is
a bearer of reality rather than simply a referential
tool, the value of the symbolic object itself is of no
concern.7 Instead, what is important in the symbol
is its ability to mediate the reality it symbolizes. The
symbol bears some reality to a recipient; it mediates the identity of its giver in order to precipitate
recognition on the part of the receiver.8 This is not
the same as a sign pointing to some object to be
recognized. The symbol bears a whom who is to be
recognized by the recipient. Both the sign and the
symbol are given from someone to someone else,
but in exchanging a sign it is the what that matters;
in giving a symbol what matters is the who who is
given to whom. In this light, the symbol in Chauvet
might be said to be inexhaustibly subjective—the
symbol bears the reality of the giver in order to
make recognition possible in the receiver. Simply
put, symbols are self-communication. They allow
Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence, trans. Patrick Madigan, SJ, and
Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press,
1995), 102-107.
6
See for example his discussion of Mauss (Chauvet, Symbol and
Sacrament, 100-102). C.f. also Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form
and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. W.D. Halls (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1990).
7
Chauvet, The Sacraments, 84.
8
Chauvet, The Sacraments, 74; Symbol and Sacrament, 112.
5
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one subject to communicate him- or herself to
another subject.9
Second, reception of a symbol requires
some degree of participation on the part of the receiver—it is never an objective reception. In the exchange of a sign, one might imagine two essentially
disinterested parties transferring some knowledge
or object from one to the other, and subsequently
continuing on their respective ways unchanged.
This is because in signs the what is important—I
might give someone a certain something, and it is
the transfer of that thing that might be essential.
However if, when I give that something to someone, what is important is instead the relationship
that I am forging with him or her, I have largely
exited the world of sign and entered the symbolic.
This means, since it is a relationship that is at stake,
the only possible way to receive the something is
actively—that is, for the receiver to take some action
with regard to the thing, the giver, and the receiver
him- or herself.
All this is to say that symbolic exchange—
i.e. the gift—requires in its reception a return-gift. In
Chauvet’s words, “there is ‘reception’ (of the gift as
gift) only by the obligatory implication of a returngift. In other words, the return-gift is the mark of
reception.”10 In symbolic exchange, there can be
no discrete chronological (or even just logical) steps
of receiving and then responding. Rather, receiving
and responding are simultaneous actions of the full
predicate of symbolic exchange. Since the symbol
mediates one subject to the other, the relationship—
necessarily a dynamic concept—is altered, so reception as dynamic is the only possibility. Reception
and return-gift cannot play out as act and response.
The gift is only received by virtue of the return-gift.
To be fair, there is a specific telos Chauvet
has in mind when he forges this construction of
symbol and the gift (a hermeneutic about which he
is forthcoming and unapologetic): Christian life/
ethics and liturgy. For him, the whole point of
speaking of symbol and the gift at all is to understand more fully the giver par excellence: God in
Christ, made present in the sacraments, especially
at the Eucharist. In order to more fully apprehend
Chauvet’s conception of the gift and symbol, this
section concludes with a brief look at how he sees
them playing out in Christianity.
9
10

Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 119.
Chauvet, The Sacraments, 122.
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The first immediately apparent point is that
for Chauvet, since the symbol is a mediation of
one self to another, that which is mediated in the
Christian imagination is the reality of God’s love as
grace. For Chauvet, God initiates the gift of grace
as exactly that—gratuitous giving, without provocation—and gives it in a character of graciousness,
that is, in a character of being beyond price or appraisal.11 What is given in grace, if it can be called
anything, is the love of God for us, and as such it is
characterized by gratuitousness (in that it is free and
undeserved) and graciousness (in that it is outside
of price, “beyond the useful and the useless”).12
The grace of God is not for Chauvet a thing transferred; rather it is a reality mediated. It cannot be
signified—it can only be symbolized.
This last is the reason Chauvet is so keen
on a theology of the sacraments. For him, the mediation of grace takes place through the symbols of
the sacraments—especially the Eucharist.13 Since
we are bodily creatures, the only ways in which we
can appropriate any measure of reality are bodily
ways.14 Symbols allow that which is not essentially
bodily to be mediated to those who essentially are.
In the Eucharist, the reality of God’s grace—in Jesus Christ—becomes present in the bread and wine,
which in turn mediate that reality to the gathered
Christian community. The gift is given as a symbol,
which is to say (for Chauvet), in the most real way
possible.
While God does give grace freely in the
Eucharist, recall that for Chauvet, reception of the
gift is predicated only by the recipients’ return-gift.
In this way Chauvet is able to link the celebration
of the Eucharist immediately to Christian ethics.
It might be easy at this point to reify grace and action in Chauvet’s vision, arguing that God gives us
something in the Eucharist, and we in turn must repay God by giving things to others. However, such
would be a misreading of the thrust of Chauvet’s
argument. In his conception, the graciousness
of God’s gift in the Eucharist (that which puts it
Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 108-109.
Ibid.
13
One might be able to speak about God’s grace outside the
sacraments in the theology of Chauvet, but such a question runs
beyond the scope of this discussion.
14
Chauvet’s theology of the body is tied directly to that of language, symbol, and mediation. Too much detail is unwarranted
here, but suffice it to say that Chauvet can even speak of the
body as the “arch-symbol” mediating human reality (Chauvet,
Symbol and Sacrament, 151).
11
12

outside economic calculation) is essential also to
the return-gift of the human recipients.15 Humans
cannot repay that which is outside of value. They
cannot give back in either want or excess—they
can only respond in kind or out of kind. Receiving
grace as the act of God (or, as Godself) is inseparable from giving oneself back as a subject through
whom grace can continue to be given.16 Christians
only successfully receive the Eucharist when they
respond with the love of neighbor, which is mediated through bodily acts of charity/ethics (and
likewise, if Christians respond without love of
neighbor, God’s gift of grace has been frustrated).
God’s grace in this way has been successfully mediated to Christians only when they respond with
graciousness toward others. This is not calculation
and repayment. This is reception as response; grace
as gift necessarily proliferates itself, else it was never
received at all.
Jacques Derrida
Unlike Chauvet, Derrida approaches the
idea of the gift as anything but a given. For him, the
gift is exactly what he calls “the impossible.”17 Giving is not necessarily impossible (though it is only in
light of death that giving and taking are possible),18
but giving a/the gift is the impossible. As such,
speaking of the gift for Derrida is always speaking of something that cannot be nailed down—it
is an enigma. This section of the discussion briefly
explores the specific kind of impossibility that
Derrida sees in the gift, and moves subsequently on
to explore what in his thought the gift (if there is
any)19 might be, or what it must look like.

Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 109.
Phillipe Bordeyne, “The Ethical Horizon of Liturgy,” in Sacraments: Revelation of the Humanity of God: Engaging the Fundamental
Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet, eds. Philippe Bordeyne and Bruce
T. Morrill (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2008), 130.
17
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy
Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 7.
18
Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret, 2nd ed.,
trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008),
45. The relation of the gift to death is a worthy topic in order
to completely understand where Derrida is coming from with
the concept of the gift. However, this discussion limits itself to
a brief outline of Derrida’s vision, and so will draw almost exclusively from his work Given Time rather than The Gift of Death.
19
Derrida often uses this phrase in qualifying the impossible.
He does not want to presume anything about the gift, least of
all its existence.
15
16
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For Derrida, the gift is impossibility—“not
impossible but the impossible.”20 This distinction
may seem slight, but understanding what Derrida
means by it helps throw into sharper relief a good
deal of what he does with the gift. There are certain
things in the world that are simply impossible: palm
trees do not grow in the tundra, it is impossible to
see amoebas without a microscope, and people will
never be wholly satisfied with whatever the current tax rate is. However, these impossible things
are characterized by a specific type of impossibility,
namely, they are impossible because some element
in them is left wanting. Palm trees want for hardiness; if they could survive colder temperatures,
perhaps they could indeed grow in the tundra.
The human eye wants for keenness; if it were a
good deal keener, we might be able to see amoebas
without using microscopes. And of course, if taxes
were just and humans were patient and charitable,
perhaps we could be satisfied with the rate.
In each of these situations, want precipitates impossibility. However, one could imagine
a world in which these things would not be impossible. The issues are derivatively impossible; if
circumstances were different, they might indeed
be possible. This is qualitatively different from the
impossibility of the gift. For Derrida, the gift is the
impossible, that is, the essence of what makes a gift
also makes it impossible. This might be called intrinsic impossibility, and it also has its members: round
squares, hot ice, vegetarian steaks, and other things
that border on the absurd. These are trite examples,
but they approximate where Derrida wants to go
with the gift. As gift, the gift is impossibility. Its
impossibility does not derive from anything lacking about the concept, the material, or the performance. Rather, it is the impossible precisely because
those things that constitute it are—as a set—impossible. For Derrida, it is not want that makes the gift
impossible; it is exactly the purity of the gift—the
necessary purity—that qualitatively separates it
from the realm of the possible.
The constitution of the gift in Derrida, i.e.
the essential elements that precipitate the gift’s impossibility, might be thought of as threefold: (1) the
structure of the gift, (2) the character of the gift,
and (3) the matter of the gift.21 The first constitutive element of the gift, that of its structure, DerDerrida, Given Time, 7.
Here I mean matter as body or material, not matter as issue
or problem.
20
21
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rida explains as deriving basically from convention:
“some ‘one’ intends to give or gives ‘something’ to
‘someone other.’”22 For the gift to be a gift, there
ought to be a giver, a gift, and a receiver—absence
of any of these three components causes the gift to
present itself to us as incomplete.23 Derrida points
out that this structure in the end amounts to a
tautology; if we try to explain what the structure of
the gift is, we immediately assume that our audience
already has some “precomprehension” of the gift.24
In his words, when I define the gift’s structure, “I
suppose that I know and that you know what ‘to
give,’ ‘gift,’ ‘donor,’ ‘donee,’ mean in our common
language.”25 This is the first constituent and also
the first trouble with the gift—any attempt to apprehend its structure of giver-gift-receiver presupposes its definition in the explanation—but this
does not, on its own, make the gift the impossible.
For that, the other two constitutive elements are
needed.
The second constitutive element of the
gift, its character, is what ought to separate it from
an economic exchange of goods or services: the
gift must be gratuitous. As Derrida articulates, “For
there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, counterfeit, or debt.”26 In essence,
the gift must be free, in all senses of the term. On
a certain level this character of the gift would be
obvious, but Derrida takes a very hard stance on the
purity of the gift’s gratuitousness. For him, any reciprocity for a gift given is tantamount to repayment
(which nullifies the gift), any satisfaction or even
giving intention on the part of the giver is the same
as reimbursement (also nullifying the gift), and even
any recognition of the gift or the giver on the part of
the receiver is equal to compensation (which, of
course, nullifies the gift as well).27 The character of
gratuitousness is itself the problematic—it does not
on its own make the gift the impossible, but joining
it to the structure and matter of the gift does.
The third constitutive element of the gift—
its matter—has to do with its necessary dependence
on systems of economy and value. While the gift
Derrida, Given Time, 11.
This is not to say that each component must be recognized by
the others; rather, the gift needs to have each of these three parts
to be considered any kind of transfer at all.
24
Derrida, Given Time, 11.
25
Ibid.,
26
Ibid., 12.
27
Ibid., 12, 13, 14, 16, 23.
22
23
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must be gratuitous, the gift itself must have some
value in order to qualify as a gift. What gift could
be a gift if it were in no sense valuable, at least to
some degree? Further, a gift’s value is generally
determined by an economy, whether it is of simple
economy or of symbolic28 value. This is what Derrida means when he says, “Now the gift, if there is
any, would no doubt be related to economy. One
cannot treat the gift … without treating this relation
to economy, even to the money economy.”29 The
point for Derrida is that the gift is inseparable from
value and economy on the one hand, but that on
the other it must be in a way separated from value
and economy. The circle of economic exchange is
assumed by the gift, but it must remain foreign to
the gift. In Derrida’s words, “If the figure of the
circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain
aneconomic. Not that it remains foreign to the circle,
but it must keep a relation of foreignness to the
circle.”30 If the gift touches economy, then it is no
longer a gift, but if it is completely separated from
economy, then likewise it is no longer a gift. Again,
this on its own does not preclude the possibility
of the gift, but when it is taken with the other two
constitutive elements, the gift remains the impossible.
While Derrida goes to lengths to explain
why the gift is the impossible, he nevertheless does
not rule out the gift’s reality. The structure, character, and matter of the gift preclude its possibility, but they do not undo the gift as gift. Derrida
circumvents the inherent impossibility of the gift by
arguing that the gift, if there is any, takes place only
on the condition of forgetting.31 For Derrida, if
the gift is recognized as what it is, it vanishes. Recognizing the gift as what it is would require seeing
the structure, character, and matter all at the same
time—and that is exactly what is impossible about
the gift. The very constitution of the gift makes it
the impossible, so recognition or remembrance of
the gift jars it out of reality and hides it again in
impossibility. Derrida does not argue that the gift
is an impossible phenomenon; instead, he argues
that it cannot present itself as a phenomenon,
because as a phenomenon it is the impossible. In
his words, “The gift itself—we dare not say the gift

in itself—will never be confused with the presence
of its phenomenon.”32 Therefore, for the gift to
take place, it relies completely on the condition of
forgetting—both the forgetting of the giver and the
receiver.
On the part of the giver, recall that for
Derrida the simple intention to give is enough to
nullify the gift. The reason for this is that intention
to give (to say nothing of actually giving) spontaneously creates in the giver a sense of self-satisfaction.33 Since this is the case, the giver has received
something in the act of giving, and so the gift’s
relation of foreignness to the circle of economic
exchange has been compromised, and the gift
vanishes. For Derrida, if there is any reception of
anything in the act of giving, then the gift is nullified.
He is not content to separate giving and receiving
from each other if they are consequent upon the
same action. For him, if giving and receiving are
parts of a single action, then the gift is nullified.
In this light, the giver must forget both the giving
and the gift itself, and only then can the gift, as the
impossible, take place.
The receiver’s forgetting is not altogether
different from the forgetting required of the giver.
For Derrida, as soon as the receiver recognizes the
gift (that is, recognizes him- or herself as a receiver),
he or she is put under a feeling of obligation.34
This feeling, whether intuited or made explicit, nullifies the gift. Derrida argues that the actual performance of receiving makes no difference as far as
the integrity of the gift is concerned. For him, even
if the intended receiver refuses the gift, the mere
recognition that it was offered is enough to cause
the gift to vanish.35 On the one hand the giver—if
he or she recognizes the gift—receives in some sense
(which destroys the gift), and on the other the
receiver—if he or she recognizes the gift—gives in
some sense (whether giving thanks, feeling under
obligation, or whatever), and such a fact causes
the gift to fall back into impossibility. For Derrida,
recognition of the gift, whether on the part of
the giver or the receiver, nullifies it. The gift is the
impossible—it might be real and concrete, but only
if it is immediately forgotten as such.36
Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 23.
34
Ibid., 14-15.
35
Ibid., 14.
36
Derrida does mention that this forgetting cannot be a simple
non-experience. The gift must be really experienced, but then
32

This use of symbolic is not the same as the term in Chauvet, but
a discussion of that difference must wait just a bit.
29
Derrida, Given Time, 7. Emphasis in original.
30
Ibid. Emphases in original.
31
Ibid., 16-18.
28

33
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Chauvet and Derrida: A Conversation
A first point of conversation between
Chauvet and Derrida must be the question of
how blatantly (or not) the gift can present itself
as such to observers and participants. Recall that
Chauvet essentially takes Mauss at his word when
he describes archaic societies that operate on an
“economy” of gift exchange.37 Derrida however,
argues that “Marcel Mauss’s The Gift speaks of
everything but the gift: It deals with economy,
exchange, contract (do ut des), it speaks of raising the
stakes, sacrifice, gift and countergift.”38 For Derrida,
the mere fact that the societies Mauss discusses can
intimate obligation and reciprocity means that they
are outside the realm of the gift. They do not give
gifts, because there are always strings attached.
For Chauvet (as well as for Mauss), reciprocity and return-gift do not suffice to nullify
gift giving. This is the first legitimate difference
between Chauvet and Derrida as they approach the
gift: Chauvet calls the gift what Derrida lumps in
with economic exchange. To be fair, Chauvet is not
unaware of what he is doing—he knows that necessary reciprocity or “obligatory generosity” might be
terms that would set off the likes of Derrida, but
he joins Mauss in saying “The terms which we have
used—present, gift—are not in themselves completely exact. We find no others; this is the best we
can do.”39 However, Chauvet would not be content
to concede that what he calls the gift is really just
veiled market business. He holds that economic
systems of gift exchange are “of a completely different
order than that of the marketplace or of value.”40
For Chauvet, while gift exchanges do not always (or,
he might agree with Derrida in saying, ever) appear
in the purity of satisfying the three constitutive elements of the Derridian concept of the gift, he also
maintains that the gift as it appears is still qualitatively different than payment—reciprocity and
attached strings included. Chauvet argues that the
gift as it appears in phenomena is actually symbolic
exchange, which separates it from market exchange.
completely forgotten as such. It must reveal itself, but in doing
so immediately conceal itself again in the same instant. This is
part of its impossibility (and one that runs beyond the scope
of this discussion)—the gift is impossible because its necessary
condition, immediate forgetting, defies time. (C.f. Derrida, Given
Time, 17-22.)
37
Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 100-102.
38
Derrida, Given Time, 24.
39
Marcel Mauss, qtd. in Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 101.
40
Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 100. Emphasis in original.
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At this point, Chauvet’s insistence upon using the category of symbol—specifically as separate
from categories of value and economy—produces a
distinction that is foreign to Derrida. Derrida does
not immediately appear to have a robust philosophy
of the symbol. He does use the term, but seems
to do so in a far more conventional than rigorous
sense: symbol (or symbolic) for him connotes nonmaterial objects, like gratification or satisfaction,
that are generally “paid” to oneself if one does not
forget the gift.41 Derrida does not attempt to conflate symbol and sign—for him the symbol surely
bears a reality to the receiver—but he does equate
the reality borne by the symbol with an object of
economy. For him, it seems that non-material realities—satisfaction, gratitude, forgiveness, perhaps
even love—amount qualitatively to the same thing
as dollars and cents where the gift is concerned.
They are forms of payment or repayment; they
make the gift the impossible, rather than liberating
it from economy.
The question becomes, is Chauvet right
to distinguish the symbolic order from that of
sign and economy? Is there a qualitative difference between symbols and the realities they bear
on the one hand, and signs and the economies they
represent on the other? One might find a partial
answer to this question in the rationale Chauvet
gives for distinguishing symbol and sign (i.e. gift
and economy): for him, symbols do not simply bear
satisfaction or gratitude. Symbols might represent
those things, but they bear the reality of the giver to
the receiver.42 This is a concept to which Derrida
pays little if any attention. For Chauvet, when a gift
is given, i.e. when a symbolic exchange is performed,
the symbol mediates the reality of one entity to
another. It is saturated not just with feelings or convictions; it is saturated with the self who gives. This
may not satisfy the three elements of the gift that
are necessary for Derrida, but it may still separate
the symbol from market exchange. Selves cannot
be paid one to another—for Chauvet they may be
mediated symbolically, but that can only be a gift, not
a market exchange.
Chauvet’s oft-repeated concept of grace
mediated in the sacraments provides a good example of the difference Chauvet sees that Derrida does not. Recall that for Chauvet, God gives
41
42

Derrida, Given Time, 11, 14, 23.
Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 119.
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Godself in the sacraments, being mediated through
the physical symbols of the rituals, and humans
respond by giving themselves symbolically through
their own actions and gifts. It remains important
that for Chauvet, Christians’ reception and response
constitute a single act—God gives, and Christians
receive/respond. Christians do not, in Chauvet’s
view, receive and then respond. Given this construction, what happens in the sacraments—perhaps
most explicitly in the Eucharist—is a symbolic
exchange, that is, an actual exchange of gifts. Christians receive the Triune God, and give themselves
to God and others.43
Could Derrida see in this symbolic exchange something that is quite different from
market exchange? It does not seem so. It would
be an open question whether or not Derrida could
assent to an idea of symbols in which they mediate
the reality of those who give them, but regardless
of whether he could or not, he would still argue
that exchange can have nothing to do with the gift.
Symbolic exchange, for Derrida, would eliminate
the gift simply because it is an exchange. There is
reciprocity; ergo there is no gift. There is return-gift;
ergo the gift itself vanishes. Exchange for Derrida
must remain alien to the gift.
In this light, there appear two main differences between Derrida and Chauvet with respect to
symbol and the gift. First and perhaps more obviously, there is the difference in their definitions of
the gift. Chauvet can speak of reciprocity in the gift
because of his concept of symbol and mediation.
Derrida would shun such an idea because the gift
can admit of no reciprocity. While this may or may
not be a complete impasse between the two figures,
it brings to light the second difference:
The second difference that appears is
one of hermeneutics. Chauvet, as he employs an
explicitly Christian/sacramental hermeneutic, is able
to speak of symbolic exchange and consequently
the gift to a certain extent because revelation allows
him to do so. God giving Godself by the mediation
of the sacraments is a claim steeped in the Christian
tradition nearly from the beginning. What Chauvet
has done is reckoned with this from the standpoint
of contemporary philosophy,44 and has concluded
This of course is the ideal case. Chauvet describes a vision of
symbols and sacraments—the fact that it does not play out always and everywhere does not invalidate the fact that it does
play out sometimes and somewhere.
44
A good deal of Chauvet’s project is a critique of traditional
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that from the Christian standpoint, gift and return-gift
touch each other in the sacraments. Christians do
not (because they cannot) repay God by their actions. Ethics as response to liturgy is actually ethics
as reception in liturgy. This fact—that Christians do
not give things back to God or others, but rather
receive grace by giving themselves to others—is the
insight that allows Chauvet to distinguish between
symbolic (gift) exchange and market exchange. The
distinction is not a simple product of his presuppositions, but his hermeneutical approach certainly
does make the distinction possible.
Derrida, for his part, is dependant upon
his hermeneutic just as much as Chauvet. This can
be most easily seen in Derrida’s starting point: the
gift as the impossible. Without giving too much into
cynicism, one can tentatively ask this: if Derrida
begins with the assertion that the gift is an enigma,
the impossible, then who could reasonably expect
him to conclude anything else? Or, more directly,
one must ask of Derrida why he can conceive of
the gift as the impossible. Is it primarily because
of his deductions and arguments? This of course
might be so (just as Chauvet might have put together
his vision of symbol and gift simply by reflecting
on Christian rites and reflections), but is it likely?
Would it not be equally likely to maintain that what
allows Derrida to form his rather rigorous conception of the gift as the impossible is instead the
fact that he does not share Chauvet’s hermeneutic
of Christianity? Derrida has little hermeneutical
reason to defend the gift in symbol or sacrament (it
is noteworthy that he is quite comfortable with the
idea of infinite deferral of “the impossible,” i.e. the
gift that is essentially never given),45 so he ends up
with the gift as the impossible. Again, like Chauvet,
this is not a simple product of his presuppositions,
but his hermeneutical principles certainly make his
conclusions possible.
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John D. Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible: On God and
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Conclusion
This discussion has argued that the main
difference between Louis-Marie Chauvet and
Jacques Derrida with regard to the gift is the fact
that Chauvet is content to speak of the gift even
within the context of some exchange (i.e. symbolic
exchange), while Derrida cannot admit into the gift
any hint of reciprocity or return. Beginning with
Chauvet’s concept of the symbol and its relation to
the order of gift exchange—as opposed to the sign
and its relation to market economy—the discussion
moved on to briefly explore the reason Chauvet is
comfortable speaking of the gift within symbolic
exchange. For Chauvet, the symbol/gift is a bearer
of the reality of the giver, a mediation of presence.
As such, it is qualitatively different from economic
exchange. This is thrown into sharp relief when
speaking about Christian symbols in the sacraments,
and the reality of grace they mediate. For Chauvet,
the only way to really receive the gift of grace (and
for him it is a gift) is to respond with the returngift of one’s self in service to others. Receiving
and returning the gift do not invalidate the gift for
Chauvet; they make it possible in the first place.
Derrida’s conception of the gift is quite
different. For him, reciprocity of any kind nullifies the gift. The authentic gift, for Derrida, is
constituted in three ways: First, its structure is one
of someone giving something to someone else.
Second, its character must be complete gratuitous-
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ness, else it falls back into economy. Third, its
matter must be composed of value and economy,
but only insofar as the gift retains a relationship of
foreignness and interruption to value and economy.
Consequently, Derrida composes a vision of the
gift that requires a radical forgetting, if the gift is
ever to take place. The giver cannot remember the
gift, and the receiver cannot remember the gift—in
fact neither can even continue to recognize the gift as
such, on pain of invalidating it as the gift.
After these (all too) brief explanations of
Chauvet and Derrida, the discussion moved on to
maintain that Chauvet’s concept of symbol gives
him access to a distinction of which Derrida is
either unaware or to which he refuses to assent. The
qualitative difference between symbolic exchange
and economic/market exchange in Chauvet is, in
Derrida, no difference at all—for him, the two
are essentially the same. The discussion finishes
by arguing that in light of Chauvet’s conflation of
reception and ethics/return-gift—and Derrida’s
insistence that such a construction would be absurd
for the gift—the hermeneutical approaches of
each author most likely play a part in their respective ability or inability to see the gift in exchange
(i.e. symbolic exchange). Their conclusions do not
spring immediately from their start-points without
reflection, but it is unlikely that their beginning assumptions have nothing to do with their completed
visions.
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